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Abstract—We consider a hypothesis testing problem with
privacy constraints over a noisy channel and derive fundamental
limits of optimal tests under the Neyman-Pearson criterion. The
fundamental limit of interest is the privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT)
between the exponent of the type-II error probability and the
leakage of the information source subject to a constant constraint
on the type-I error probability. We provide exact characterization
of the asymptotic PUT for any non-vanishing type-I error
probability. In particular, we show that tolerating a larger type-
I error probability cannot increase the PUT. Such a result
is known as strong converse or strong impossibility theorem.
To prove the strong converse theorem, we apply the recently
proposed strong converse technique by Tyagi and Watanabe (TIT
2020) and further demonstrate the generality of the technique.
The strong converse theorems for several problems, such as
hypothesis testing against independence over a noisy channel
(Sreekumar and Gu¨ndu¨z, TIT 2020) and hypothesis testing with
communication and privacy constraints (Gilani et al., Entropy
2020), are established or recovered as special cases of our result.
Index Terms—Hypothesis testing with privacy constraints,
privacy-utility tradeoff, strong converse, information leakage,
mutual information, noisy channel, asymptotic, non-asymptotic
converse, Euclidean information theory
I. INTRODUCTION
In the binary hypothesis testing problem, given a test
sequence Xn and two distributions P and Q, one is asked to
determine whether the test sequence is generated i.i.d. from P
or Q. The performance of any test is evaluated by the tradeoff
between the type-I and type-II error probability. Under the
Neyman Pearson setting where one constraints the type-I error
probability to be upper bounded by a constant, the likelihood
ratio test [1] is proved optimal. Chernoff-Stein lemma [2]
states that the type-II error probability decays exponentially
fast with exponent D(Q‖P ) when type-I error probability
vanishes and the length of the test sequence tends to infinity.
This result was later refined by by Strassen [3] who provided
exact second-order asymptotic characterization of the type-II
error exponent for any non-vanishing type-I error probability.
A corollary of the result in [3] states that the asymptotic type-
II error exponent remains D(Q‖P ) regardless of the non-
vanishing type-I error probability. Such a result is known as
strong converse, which implies that tolerating a larger type-I
error probability cannot increase the asymptotic decay rate of
the type-II error probability for an optimal test.
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The simple binary hypothesis testing problem was later
generalized into diverse scenarios. Motivated by the applica-
tion where the source sequence might be only available to
a decision maker via rate-limited communication, Ahlswede
and Csisza´r [4] initiated the study of the hypothesis testing
problem with communication constraints. The authors of [4]
gave exact asymptotic characterization of the rate-exponent
tradeoff subject to a vanishing type-I error probability and
proved a strong converse result for the special case of testing
against independence. Recently, motivated by the fact the
source sequence is transmitted over a noisy channel in certain
applications such as a sensor network [5], Sreekumar and
Gu¨ndu¨z [6] further generalized the setting of [4] by adding a
noisy channel between the transmitter of the source sequence
and the decision maker. However, the authors of [6] derived
only a weak converse result which holds for vanishing type-I
error probability. For the case of testing against independence,
a plausible strong converse result was claimed in [7] when the
bandwidth expansion ratio (defined as the ratio between the
number of channel uses and the length of the source sequence)
is 1 by combining the blowing up lemma [8] and the strong
converse technique recently proposed [9].
Another generalization of the binary hypothesis testing
framework takes privacy into consideration. Motivated by the
privacy concerns in modern data analyses or machine learning
tasks, Liao et al. [10] applied a privacy mechanism to the
original sequences to remove private parts and then studied
the hypothesis testing problem with a privacy constraint.
In particular, the authors of [10] derived the privacy-utility
tradeoff [11] between the decay rate of type-I and type-II
error probabilities and the leakage of the information sources
measured with mutual information. Subsequently, the setting
in [10] was generalized to the case with communication
constraints by Gilani et al. [12].
In this paper, motivated by i) practical applications where
there is a noisy channel between the detector and the trans-
mitter for a hypothesis test and ii) the privacy concerns of the
transmitter, we study the privacy-utility tradeoff in a unified
model of [12], [13]. In particular, we consider a hypothesis
testing problem over a noisy channel with a privacy constraint
as shown in Figure 1. Our main contribution is the exact
characterization of the privacy-utility tradeoff between the
decay rate of type-II error probability and the information
leakage at the transmitter subject to a constraint on the type-I
error probability. Special cases of our result refine or recover
the results in [12], [13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we formally set up the notation, formulate the hypothesis test-
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Fig. 1. Hypothesis testing over a noisy channel with a privacy constraint. The transmitter observes source information Uk and applies a privacy mechanism
to obtain non-private information Zk . Subsequently, the transmitter encodes Zk into a codeword Xn, which is passed through a noisy channel to yield output
Y n. Given Y n and side information V k , the detector decides between two hypotheses using the framework of a binary hypothesis test. The problem of
interest is the privacy-utility tradeoff between the transmitter and the detector to ensure a privacy level of source information Uk and a small error probability
at the detector.
ing problem with a privacy constraint over a noisy channel and
define the privacy-utility tradeoff. Subsequently, we present
our characterization of the PUT in Section III. The proof of
our results is given in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we
conclude the paper and discuss future research directions. For
smooth presentation of our results, the proofs of all supporting
lemmas are deferred to appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation
Random variables and their realizations are in upper (e.g.,
X) and lower case (e.g., x) respectively. All sets are denoted
in calligraphic font (e.g., X ). We use X c to denote the
complement of X . Let Xn := (X1, . . . , Xn) be a random
vector of length n and xn its realization. All logarithms are
base e. We use R+ and N to denote the set of non-negative real
numbers and natural numbers respectively. Given any positive
integer a ∈ N, we use [a] to denote {1, · · · , a}. The set of
all probability distributions on a finite set X is denoted as
P(X ). For quantities such as entropy and mutual information,
we follow the notation in [8]. In particular, when the joint
distribution of (X,Y ) is PXY ∈ P(X ×Y), we use I(X;Y )
and I(PX , PY |X) interchangeably.
A. Problem Setting
Let U ,V,Z be three finite alphabets and let PUV and QUV
be two probability mass functions defined on the alphabet U×
V . Consider a discrete memoryless channel PY |X where the
input alphabet X and the output alphabet Y are both finite.
In this paper, we consider the hypothesis testing problem
with privacy constraints in Figure 1. A source sequence Uk
is observed at the transmitter and another sequence V k is
observed at the detector. In order to infer the relationship
between two observations, the transmitter sends a message
over the memoryless channel PY |X to the receiver. Given the
transmitted messages, the decoder then checks whether V k is
jointly distributed with Uk according to PUV or QUV via a
binary hypothesis test. Furthermore, for the sake of privacy,
the transmitter first applies a privacy mechanism PZk|Uk to
Uk and obtains non-private information Zk. Subsequently, a
function of Zk, known as a message, is transmitted to the
receiver over the noisy channel PY |X .
In this paper, we study the case of testing against in-
dependence, i.e., QUV = PUPV where PU and PV are
induced marginal distributions of PUV . We are interested in
optimal communication protocols and privacy mechanisms
to achieve two goals: i) guarantee the privacy constraint at
the transmitter for Uk and ii) ensure the reliable hypothesis
testing at the detector. Naturally, these two goals introduce a
privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT). Our main results provide exact
characterization of the PUT in the asymptotic setting.
Formally, a communication protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A communication protocol (fn,k, gn,k) with n
channel uses for hypothesis testing against independence over
a noisy channel consists of
(i) an encoder fn,k : Zk → Xn
(ii) and a decoder gn,k : Yn × Vk → {H1,H2} where
• H1: the sequences Uk and V k are correlated, i.e.,
(Uk, V k) ∼ P kUV
• H2 : the sequences Uk and V k are independent, i.e.,
(Uk, V k) ∼ P kUP kV .
For any protocol (fn,k, gn,k), the performance is evaluated
by the type-I and type-II error probabilities:
β1(f
n,k, gn,k) := Pr{gn,k(Y n, V k) = H2|H1}, (1)
β2(f
n,k, gn,k) := Pr{gn,k(Y n, V k) = H1|H2}, (2)
where Y n is the output of passing Xn = fn,k(Zk) over the
noisy channel PY |X . Thus, the probability terms in the right
hand side of (1) and (2) depend on the encoding function fn,k
implicitly via the noisy output Y n.
B. Definition of Privacy-Utility Tradeoff
Under the Neyman-Pearson formulation, we are interested
in the maximal type-II exponent subject to a constant con-
straint on the type-I error probability, a bandwidth expansion
ratio and a privacy constraint, i.e., for any (τ, L, ε) ∈ R2+ ×
[0, 1] and any n ∈ N,
E∗(k, τ, L, ε)
:= sup{E ∈ R+ : ∃ (fn,k, gn,k, PZk|Uk) s.t. n ≤ kτ
I(P kU , PZk|Uk) ≤ kL,
β1(f
n,k, gn,k) ≤ ε, β2(fn,k, gn,k) ≤ exp(−kE)}. (3)
Note that the privacy constraint I(P kU , PZk|Uk) is measured
using mutual information [14]. This is consistent with most lit-
erature studying physical layer security and privacy, e.g, [10],
[12], [15]–[17]. See [13, Page 3] for a justification of using
mutual information as a privacy measure.
We remark that E∗(k, τ, L, ε) represents a tension between
privacy and utility. Apparently, the larger the privacy constraint
L, the better the utility E∗(k, τ, L, ε). In the extreme case of
3L = ∞, we recover the setting without privacy constraint
as in [6, Theorem 2] and achieve the best possible utility.
In the other extreme when L = 0, we achieve the best
possible privacy while the utility E∗(k, τ, L, ε) = 0. To better
understand the privacy-utility tradeoff for non-extremal values
of L, we provide exact characterization of E∗(k, τ, L, ε) in
the limit of large k for any parameters (τ, L, ε) ∈ R2+×(0, 1).
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results, which exactly
characterize the privacy-utility tradeoff in the limit of large
k. We restrict ourselves to memoryless privacy mechanisms,
i.e., PZk|Uk = P kZ|U for some PZ|U ∈ P(Z|U). This is
because memoryless privacy mechanism is more practical due
to its simplicity and low complexity. If one adopts a non-
memoryless privacy mechanism, then as the length k of the
source sequence increases, one needs to design a different
privacy mechanism and suffers higher complexity, especially
in the case of large k. Our adoption of memoryless privacy
mechanism is consistent with existing literature, e.g. [10], [12].
Furthermore, as can be gleaned in our proofs, adopting a mem-
oryless privacy mechanism does not trivialize the problem. In
fact, our proof, especially the converse proof, requires us to
judiciously combine the analyses for the utility and the privacy.
A. Achievability
In this subsection, we present our achievability result, which
provides a lower bound on E∗(k, τ, L, ε). Several definitions
are needed. The capacity [14] of the noisy channel PY |X is
C(PY |X) = max
PX
I(PX , PY |X). (4)
Furthermore, let W be an auxiliary random variable taking
values in the alphabet C. Define the following set of distribu-
tions
Q(PUV ) := {QUV ZW ∈ Q : QUV = PUV
V − U − Z −W, |W| ≤ |Z|+ 1}. (5)
Given any QUV ZW , let Q· be induced distributions. For any
(τ, L) ∈ R2+, define the following quantity
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X)
:= max
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV ):
I(QZ ,QW |Z)≤τC(PY |X)
I(QU ,QZ|U )≤L
I(QV , QW |V ). (6)
Our achievability result states as follows.
Theorem 1. For any (τ, L, ε) ∈ R2+ ∈ (0, 1],
lim
k→∞
E∗(k, τ, L, ε) ≥ f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) (7)
Theorem 1 is a straightforward extension of [6, Theorem
2] and thus its proof is omitted. The proof of Theorem 1
proceeds in three steps. Firstly, we calculate the optimizer
Q∗UV ZW of f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) in (26). Secondly, we con-
sider the memoryless privacy mechanism Q∗Z|U and obtain
non-private information sequence Zk from Uk. Secondly,
we study a hypothesis testing problem against independence
over a noisy channel for the new source sequence Zk and
the side information V k at the decoder. The second step is
exactly the same as [6, Theorem 2] when specialized to testing
against independence and when Q∗V ZW is used to design the
communication protocol (fn,k, gn,k).
B. Converse and Discussions
Our main contribution in this paper is the following the-
orem, which presented a non-asymptotic upper bound on
the optimal type-II exponent E∗(k, τ, L, ε). As a corollary
of our result, a strong converse theorem holds. Combining
the strong converse result with Theorem 1, we provide a
complete asymptotic characterization of E∗(k, τ, L, ε) for any
ε ∈ (0, 1).
To present our result, for any (α, β) ∈ R2+, define two
constants
c(α, β, τ) := log |V|+ (α+ β) log |Z|+ ατ log |Y|, (8)
c(α, β, γ, τ) := 3
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
(
log
|W||V|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
+ α log
|Z||W|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
+ β log
|U||Z|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
)
+ 3ατ
√
2c(α, β, τ)
τγ
log
|X ||Y|√
2c(α,β,τ)
τγ
, (9)
where |W| is a finite constant. Furthermore, given any distri-
butions (QUV ZW , QXY ), for any (α, β) ∈ R2+, let
Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY )
:= I(QV , QW |V )− α(I(QZ , QW |Z)− τI(QX , QY |X))
− β(I(QU , QZ|U )− L), (10)
Rτα,β := sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
QXY ∈C:QY |X=PY |X
Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY ). (11)
Our result states as follows.
Theorem 2. Given any ε ∈ (0, 1), for any (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+,
E∗(k, τ, L, ε) ≤ Rτα,β + c(α, β, γ, τ)
+
(6α+ 2β + γ + 4) log 21−ε
k
. (12)
Furthermore, the strong converse theorem follows as a corol-
lary, i.e., for any ε ∈ (0, 1),
lim
k→∞
E∗(k, τ, L, ε) ≤ f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). (13)
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section IV. Several
remarks are in order.
Firstly, combining the strong converse result in (14) and
Theorem 1, we conclude that given any (L, τ) ∈ R2+, for any
ε ∈ (0, 1),
lim
k→∞
E∗(k, τ, L, ε) = f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). (14)
4Thus, we provide a complete characterize of the asymptotic
privacy-utility tradeoff for hypothesis testing against indepen-
dence over a noisy channel. Our result implies that the asymp-
totically optimal PUT is independent of the type-I error prob-
ability for any given privacy constraint. Therefore, tolerating
a larger type-I error probability cannot increase the privacy-
utility tradeoff of an optimal privacy and communication
protocol when the lengths of sequence tend to infinity. Such
a result is known as strong converse in information theory
(cf. [18]–[20]), which refines the classical weak converse
argument valid only for vanishing type-I error probability.
Secondly, since several problems are special cases of our
formulation, our result in (14) implies strong converse and
provides complete asymptotic characterization of fundamental
limits for all these special cases, e.g., [4], [6], [12]. In
particular, by letting L ≥ H(PU ), we recover the hypothesis
testing problem against independence (special case of [6,
Theorem 2]). To the best of our knowledge, a strong converse
theorem was not established for any τ 6= 1 prior to our
work. Furthermore, if one considers a memoryless channel
and imposes a communication constraint, i.e., PY |X is the
identity matrix and X = Y = {1, . . . ,M} for some M ∈ N,
we then recover the setting of hypothesis testing with both
communication and privacy constraints considered in [12]. The
authors of [12] proved a strong converse result for their setting
using the complicated blowing up lemma idea [8]. Our result
here provides an alternative yet simpler proof for their setting.
Thirdly, we provide a brief proof sketch. Our proof is
based on the recently proposed strong converse technique by
Tyagi and Watanabe [9] which uses the change of measure
technique and variational formulas [21], [22]. In particular,
we first derive an multiletter upper bound on the privacy-utility
tradeoff using the change of measure technique. Subsequently,
we single letterize the bound using standard techniques [14].
Finally, using the alternative variational characterization of
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) established via the supporting hyperplane,
we managed to obtain the desired result in Theorem 2.
Our proof provides a first application of the strong converse
technique by Tyagi and Watanabe [9] to a hypothesis testing
problem over a noisy channel and thus demonstrates the
generality of the technique in [9].
Fourthly, we compare our converse result with existing ones
relative with hypothesis testing over a noisy channel or with
a privacy constraint, especially [12] and [7]. The former one
corresponds to the special case where the channel is noiseless.
By considering a noisy channel in this paper, our analysis
is more complicated since we need to account for additional
errors due to the noisy nature of the channel. Our results imply
the strong converse result in [12, Theorem 2] but not vice
versa. In [7], without a privacy constraint by letting L→∞,
the authors claimed a plausible strong converse result for τ =
1 by combining [9] and the blowing up lemma [8]. In contrast,
our proof gets rid of the blowing up lemma, which is more
transparent and much simpler. Furthermore, our results hold
for any bandwidth ratio of τ while the result in [7] was only
established for the case of τ = 1.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the privacy-utility tradeoff for a correlated binary source.
C. Illustration of the PUT via a Numerical Example
Let U = V = Z = {1, 2}. Furthermore, let PU be a uniform
distribution over U and let the conditional probability of PV |U
be
PV |U (v|u) = q1{v = u}+ (1− q)1{v 6= u}, (15)
for some q ∈ [0, 1]. Let the channel PY |X be a binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability 0.2. Using
[12, Proposition 1], we can obtain the exact formula of
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). In Figure 2, we plot the privacy-utility
tradeoff for q = 0.8 and various values of τ . Note that
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) attains the maximal value for any L ≥
H(PU ) = log 2 and f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) = 0 if L = 0. For
any non-degenerate values of L ∈ (0, H(PU )), we observe a
privacy-utility tradeoff.
D. PUT under the High Privacy Limit
We then derive the PUT for the high privacy setting using
Euclidean information theory [23], i.e., when I(PU , PZ|U )
tends of zero. As argued in [10], such a result is desirable
as we always seek privacy mechanism as strong as possible.
Furthermore, the PUT under the high privacy limit serves as
the benchmark (lower bound) for the PUT under a looser
privacy constraint. Recall that both U and Z are finite al-
phabets. Without loss of generality, in this subsection, we let
U = [|U|] = {1, . . . , |U|} and let Z = [|Z|]. Furthermore, we
let W := [|W|] = [|Z|+ 1].
Under the perfect privacy limit, i.e., L = 0, we conclude
that the privacy mechanism is PZ|U=u = QZ for each u ∈ U
where QZ ∈ P(Z) is arbitrary. Furthermore, given any PW |Z ,
let Q¯W be induced by QZ and PW |Z , i.e.,
Q¯W (w) =
∑
z
QZ(z)PW |Z(w|z). (16)
Given any two finite alphabets A,B and any distribution
PA ∈ P(A), let J (A,B, PA) be the collection of all |A|×|B|
matrices such that for any J ∈ J (A,B, PA)
|J(a, b)| ≤ 1, ∀ (a, b) ∈ A× B, (17)
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∑
b∈B
J(a, b) = 0, ∀ a ∈ A, (18)∑
a∈A
PA(a)J(a, b) = 0, ∀ b ∈ B. (19)
Let J ∈ J (U ,Z, PU ) be an arbitrary. For any (v, w), define
h(J, ρ)
:=
ρ2
2
∑
v,w
PV (v)
Q¯W (w)
(∑
u,z
PU |V (u|v)PW |Z(w|z)J(u, z)
)2
,
(20)
where we use J(u, z) to denote the z-th element of u-th row
of the matrix J.
Under the high privacy limit, L can be chosen as 12ρ
2 for
an arbitrary small ρ ∈ (0, 1). Using Euclidean information
theory [23], [24], we have that when ρ is small,
f
(
τ,
ρ2
2
, PUV , PY |X
)
≈ max
QZ ,PW |Z ,J∈J (U,Z,PU ):
I(QZ ,PW |Z)≤τC(PY |X)∑
u,z:QZ (z)>0
PU (u)(J(u,z))
2
QZ (z)
≤1
h(J, ρ). (21)
In Figure 3, the approximation value in (21) is plotted
and compared with the exact value for the binary example
considered in Section III-C. We observe that the Euclidean
approximation in (21) is quite tight when the privacy constraint
L is small.
We then consider the case where the channel PY |X is
extremely noisy so that C(PY |X) is arbitrarily small. Let
QW ∈ P(W) be an arbitrary distribution, let Θ be an arbitrary
|W| × |Z| matrix and define
l(J,Θ, ρ,QZ , QW )
:=
ρ4
2
∑
v,w
PV (v)
QW (w)
(∑
u,z
PU |V (u|v)J(u, z)Θ(w, z)
)2
, (22)
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Fig. 4. Comparison of exact and approximate values for the privacy-utility
tradeoff of a binary example. Here we set τC(PY |X) = L =
ρ2
2
so that
ρ4 = 4L2. Note that in this case, the PUT f
(
τ, ρ
2
2
, PUV , PY |X
)
increases
quadratically in L.
where we use Θ(w, z) to denote the z-th element of w-th row
of the matrix Θ.
If we further assume that the channel PY |X is extremely
noisy such that τC(PY |X) =
ρ2
2 , then
f
(
τ,
ρ2
2
, PUV , PY |X
)
≈ max
QZ ,QW ,Θ∈J (W,Z,QZ),J∈J (U,Z,PU )∑
z,w:QW (w)>0
QZ (z)(Θ(w,z))
2
QW (w)
≤1∑
u,z:QZ (z)>0
PU (u)(J(u,z))
2
QZ (z)
≤1
l(J,Θ, ρ,QZ , QW ).
(23)
The justifications of (21) and (23) are provided in Appendix
A.
In Figure 4, the approximation value given in (23) is plotted
and compared with the exact value for the binary example
considered in Section III-C. We observe that the Euclidean
approximation in (23) is very tight when the privacy constraint
L is small and the channel is extremely noisy.
E. Generalizations to Multiple Transmitters
In this subsection, we generalize our result to the case where
there are multiple transmitters as in Figure 5 and provide exact
characterization for the asymptotic privacy-utility tradeoff.
Fix any m ∈ N. For each i ∈ [m], let Ui and Zi be two finite
alphabets and let P iY |X ∈ P(Yi|Xi) be a transition matrix with
finite input and output alphabets Xi and Yi. Furthermore, let V
be a finite alphabet and let PU1...,UmV be a distribution defined
on the finite alphabet
∏
i∈[m] Ui × V .
As shown in Figure 5, we consider the case with m
transmitters. For each i ∈ [m], transmitter i observes a source
sequence Uk(i) and applies a memoryless privacy mechanism
P iZ|U ∈ P(Zi|Ui) to obtain non-private information Zk(i).
Subsequently, the transmitter sends a codeword Xn(i), which
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Fig. 5. Hypothesis testing over noisy channels with privacy constraints and m transmitters. Each transmitter observes a source sequence and applies a privacy
mechanism to obtain non-private information. Subsequently, each transmitter encodes the privacy information into a codeword, which is passed through a
noisy channel to yield a channel output. Given the noisy channel outputs from all m transmitters and side information V k , the detector decides between two
hypotheses using the framework of a binary hypothesis test. The problem of interest is the privacy-utility tradeoff between the transmitters and the detector
to ensure a privacy level for each transmitter and a small error probability at the detector.
is a function of Zk(i), over a memoryless channel P iY |X . Us-
ing all the noisy channel outputs Y := (Y n(1), . . . , Y n(m))
from all transmitters and a side information V k, the detector
wishes to do the following binary hypothesis test
• H1: the sequences U := (Uk(1), . . . , Uk(m)) and V k
are correlated, i.e., (U, V k) ∼ P kU1...,UmV
• H2 : the sequences U and V k are independent, i.e.,
(Uk, V k) ∼ P kU1...,UmP kV ,
where PU1...,Um and PV are induced marginal distributions of
the joint distribution PU1...,UmV . Such a formulation is related
with distributed detection [25], [26] and has potential appli-
cations in sensor networks [5], [27] or internet of things [28],
[29].
Definition 2. A communication protocol
(fn,k1 , . . . , f
n,k
m , g
n,k) with n channel uses consists of
(i) m encoders where for each i, fn,ki : Zki → Xni
(ii) and a decoder gn,k :
∏
i∈[M ] Yni × Vk → {H1,H2}.
For simplicity, we use Fn,k to denote fn,k1 , . . . , f
n,k
m . For
any protocol (Fn,k, gn,k), the performance is evaluated by the
type-I and type-II error probabilities:
β1(F
n,k, gn,k) := Pr{gn,k(Y, V k) = H2|H1}, (24)
β2(F
n,k, gn,k) := Pr{gn,k(Y, V k) = H1|H2}, (25)
where Yn = (Y n(1), . . . , Y n(m)) and Y n(i) is the output of
passing Xn(i) = fn,k(Zk(i)) over the noisy channel P iY |X .
Thus, the probability terms in the right hand side of (24) and
(25) depend on the encoding functions implicitly via the noisy
outputs Y.
Similar to (26), given any τ ∈ R+, L = (L1, . . . , Lm) ∈
Rm+ and ε ∈ (0, 1), we define the privacy-utility tradeoff as
E∗m(k, τ,L, ε)
:= sup
{
E ∈ R+ : ∃ (Fn,k, gn,k, PZk|Uk) s.t. n ≤ kτ
β1(F
n,k, gn,k) ≤ ε, β2(Fn,k, gn,k) ≤ exp(−kE),
I(P kUi , (P
i
Z|U )
k) ≤ kLi,∀ i ∈ [m]
}
. (26)
For each i ∈ [m], let Wi be a finite alphabet where |Wi| ≤
|Zi|+ 1. To present our result, define the following quantity:
f(τ,L, ε)
:= sup
P 1Z|U ,...,P
m
Z|U ,
P 1W |Z ,...,P
m
W |Z :
I(PUi ,P
i
Z|U )≤Li
I(PZi ,P
i
W |Z)≤τC(P iY |X)
I(PV , PW1...Wm|V ), (27)
where PUi , PZi , PW1...Wm|V are induced by the joint source
distribution PU1...UmV , {P iZ|U}i∈[m] and {P iW |Z}i∈[m]. When
m = 1, the above equation gives an alternative expression for
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) (cf. (26)).
We then have the following result.
Theorem 3. Given any ε ∈ (0, 1),
lim
k→∞
E∗m(k, τ,L, ε) = f(τ,L, ε). (28)
The proof of Theorem 3 is a slight generalization of
Theorems 1 and 2 and thus omitted. In particular, for the
achievability proof, we employ the same encoding method for
all the transmitters and then consider a modified decoder which
combines all noisy channel outputs from all receivers and a
side information sequence. The converse proof is similar to
Theorem 2 except that we need to combine the analyses for
all m transmitters and deal with all m privacy constraints.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. Alternative Characterization of the Optimal PUT
In this subsection, we provide an alternative characterization
of the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) us-
ing the supporting hyperplane [22], [30]. This result is critical
to our converse proof.
Recall that PUV is generating distribution of (Uk, V k) un-
der hypothesis H1 and PY |X denotes the memoryless channel
between the transmitter and the detector. For any memoryless
privacy mechanism PZ|U , let PU , PZ , PU |Z and PV |U be
distributions induced by PUV and PZ|V . Furthermore, let
Q denote the set of all joint distributions defined on the
alphabet U × V × Z × W and let C denote the set of all
joint distributions defined on the alphabet X × Y . Given any
(QUV ZW , QXY ) ∈ Q× C, for any (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+, let
∆τγ(QUV ZW , QXY )
:= γD(QZ‖PZ) + γD(QUV |ZW ‖PZ|UPV |U |QUW )
+ τγD(QY |X‖PY |X |QX), (29)
Rτα,β,γ(QUV ZW , QXY )
:= Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY )−∆τγ(QUV ZW , QXY ), (30)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect
to induced distributions of QUV ZW and QXY . Finally, let
Rτα,β,γ := sup
QUV ZW∈Q
QXY ∈C
Rτα,β,γ(QUV ZW , QXY ). (31)
Recall the definitions of c(α, β, γ, τ) in (9), Rτα,β(·) in (10)
and Rτα,β in (11). We then have the following lemma, which
7provides an alternative characterization for the optimal type-II
error exponent using the supporting hyperplane.
Lemma 4. The following claims holds:
(i) an alternative characterization of f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) is
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) = min
(α,β)∈R2+
Rτα,β . (32)
(ii) Rτα,β,γ satisfies
Rτα,β ≤ Rτα,β,γ ≤ Rτα,β + c(α, β, γ, τ). (33)
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix B.
B. Equivalent Expressions for Error Probabilities
Fix any k ∈ N and consider any n ≤ τk. Given a
memoryless privacy mechanism P kZ|U and a communication
protocol with encoder fn,k and decoder gn,k, define the
following joint distributions:
PUkV kZkXnY n(u
k, vk, zk, xn, yn)
= P kUV (u
k, vk)P kZ|U (z
k|uk)1{xn = fn,k(zk)}
× PnY |X(yn|xn), (34)
QUkV kZkXnY n(u
k, vk, zk, xn, yn)
= P kU (u
k)P kV (v
k)P kZ|U (z
k|uk)1{xn = fn,k(zk)}
× PnY |X(yn|xn). (35)
and define the acceptance region
A := {(yn, vk) : gn,k(yn, vk) = H0}. (36)
Furthermore, let PZk , PY n , PUkZk , PY nV k and
PY nV k|UkZkXn be induced by the joint distribution
PUkV kZkXnY n and let QY nV k be induced by QUkV kZkXnY n .
Note that the marginal distribution of (Uk, Zk) is P kUZ and
the marginal distribution of V k is P kV under both distributions
PUkV kZkXnY n and QUkV kZkXnY n . Furthermore, the
marginal distribution of Y n is the same under both joint
distributions and denoted as PY n , i.e.,
PY n(y
n) :=
∑
uk,xn
P kU (u
k)1{xn = fn,k(zk)}PnY |X(yn|xn).
(37)
Then the type-I and type-II error probabilities are equiva-
lently expressed as follows:
β1(f
n,k, gn,k) = PY nV k(Ac), (38)
β2(f
n,k, gn,k) = QY nV k(A). (39)
C. Construct Truncated Distribution
We consider any memoryless privacy mechanism P kZ|U and
any and communication protocol (fn,k, gn,k) such that i) the
privacy constraint is satisfied with parameter L and ii) the
type-I error probability is upper bounded by ε ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
I(P kU , P
k
Z|U ) ≤ L, (40)
β1(f
n,k, gn,k) ≤ ε. (41)
Define a set
B :=
{
(uk, zk) :
PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|uk, zk, fn,k(zk)) ≥
1− ε
2
}
. (42)
Using (38) and (41), we have
1− ε
≤ PY nV k(A) (43)
=
∑
uk,zk,vk,xn,yn:
(vk,yn)∈A
PUkV kZkXnY n(u
k, vk, zk, xn, yn) (44)
=
∑
uk,zk
P kUZ(u
k, zk)PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|uk, zk, fn,k(zk))
(45)
=
∑
(uk,zk)∈B
P kUZ(u
k, zk)PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|uk, zk, fn,k(zk))
+
∑
(uk,zk)/∈B
P kUZ(u
k, zk)PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|uk, zk, fn,k(zk))
(46)
= PUkZk(B) +
1− ε
2
. (47)
Thus,
PUkZk(B) ≥
1− ε
2
. (48)
Consider random variables (U˜k, Z˜k, V˜ k, X˜n, Y˜ n) with joint
distribution PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n such that
PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n(u
k, zk, vk, xn, yn)
=
P kU (u
k)P kZ|U (z
k|uk)1{zk ∈ B}1{fn,k(zk) = xn}
PUkZk(B)
× PY nV k|UkZkXn(y
n, vk|uk, zk, xn)1{(yn, vk) ∈ A}
PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|uk, zk, xn)
.
(49)
Let PY˜ n , PV˜ k and PY˜ nV˜ k be induced by PZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n . From
(49), we have
PY˜ nV˜ k(A) = 1. (50)
Note that the constructed distribution PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n is in
fact close to the distribution PZkV kXnY n in terms of KL
divergence, i.e.,
D(PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n‖PUkZkV kXnY n)
=
∑
uk,zk,vk,xn,yn
PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n(u
k, zk, vk, xn, yn)
× log PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n(u
k, zk, vk, xn, yn)
PUkZkV kXnY n(uk, zk, vk, xn, yn)
(51)
=
∑
uk,zk,vk,xn,yn
PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n(u
k, zk, vk, xn, yn)
× log 1
PUkZk(B)PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|uk, zk, xn)
(52)
≤ 2 log 2
1− ε , (53)
8where (53) follows from the definition of B in (42) and the
result in (48).
D. Multiletter Bound for PUT
Using (40), we have
L ≥ I(P kU , P kZ|U ) (54)
≥ I(U˜k, Z˜k), (55)
where (55) follows from data processing inequality for KL
divergence since (U˜k, Z˜k) are functions of (Uk, Zk) (cf. (49)).
We then derive an upper bound on the type-II error expo-
nent. Using (39), we have
− log β2(fn,k, gn,k)
= − logQY nV k(A) (56)
≤ D(PY˜ nV˜ k‖QY nV k) (57)
= D(PY˜ nV˜ k‖PY nP kV ) (58)
= D(PY˜ nV˜ k‖PY˜ nPV˜ k)
+
∑
yn,vk
PY˜ nV˜ k(y
n, vk) log
PY˜ n(y
n)PV˜ k(v
k)
PY n(yn)P kV (v
k)
(59)
= D(PY˜ nV˜ k‖PY˜ nPV˜ k) + 4 log
2
1− ε (60)
= I(Y˜ n; V˜ k) + 4 log
2
1− ε , (61)
where (57) follows from the log-sum inequality and the result
in (50), (58) follows from the definition of QY nV k (cf. (35)),
and (60) follows since from (42), (48) and (49),
PY˜ n(y
n)
=
∑
uk,zk,vk,xn
PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n(u
k, zk, vk, xn, yn) (62)
≤
∑
uk,zk,vk
P kU (u
k)P kZ|U (z
k|uk)
PUkZk(B)
× PY nV k|UkZkXn(y
n, vk|uk, zk, fn,k(zk))
PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|zk, fn,k(zk))
(63)
≤ PY n(y
n)
PUkZk(B)PY nV k|UkZkXn(A|zk, fn,k(zk))
(64)
≤ 4PY n(y
n)
(1− ε)2 (65)
and similarly PV˜ k(v
k) ≤ 4PkV (vk)(1−ε)2 .
Recall the joint distribution of (U˜k, Z˜k, V˜ k, X˜n, Y˜ n) in
(49). We have
I(Z˜k, V˜ k; Y˜ n)− I(X˜n; Y˜ n)
= I(Z˜k, V˜ k, X˜n; Y˜ n)− I(X˜n; Y˜ n) (66)
= I(Z˜k, V˜ k; Y˜ n|X˜n) (67)
= D(PY˜ n|Z˜kV˜ kX˜n‖PY˜ n|X˜n |PZ˜kV˜ kX˜n) (68)
= D(PY˜ n|Z˜kV˜ kX˜n‖PY n|ZkV kXn |PZ˜kV˜ kX˜n)
−D(PY˜ n|X˜n‖PnY |X |PX˜n) (69)
≤ D(PY˜ n|Z˜kV˜ kX˜n‖PY n|ZkV kXn |PZ˜kV˜ kX˜n) (70)
≤ D(PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n‖PUkZkV kXnY n) (71)
≤ 2 log 2
1− ε , (72)
where (66) follows since X˜n is a function of Z˜k under the
joint distribution in (49), (69) follows from the Markov chain
Y n−Xn− (Uk, V k) under the joint distribution PZkV kXnY n
(cf. (34)) and (72) follows from (53).
Combining (53), (55), (61) and (72), for any (α, β) ∈ R2+,
we have
− log β2(fn,k, gn,k)
≤ I(Y˜ n; V˜ k)− α(I(Z˜k, V˜ k; Y˜ n)− I(X˜n; Y˜ n))
− β(I(U˜k; Z˜k)− L) + (2α+ γ + 4) log 2
1− ε
− γD(PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n‖PUkZkV kXnY n). (73)
E. Single Letterize PUT
For any n ∈ N, let Jn be the uniform random variable
over [n], which is independent of any other random variables.
Furthermore, for simplicity, we use J to denote Jk. For each
i ∈ [k], let Wi := (Z˜i−1, V˜ i−1, Y˜ n). Using standard single-
letterization technique, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. The following results hold:
I(U˜k; Z˜k) ≥ kI(U˜J ; Z˜J)− 2 log 1− ε
2
(74)
I(Y˜ n; V˜ k) ≤ kI(WJ , J ; V˜J), (75)
I(X˜n; Y˜ n) ≤ nI(X˜Jn ; Y˜Jn , Jn) + 2 log
2
1− ε , (76)
I(Z˜k, V˜ k; Y˜ n) ≥ kI(Z˜J ;WJ , J)− 2 log 2
1− ε , (77)
(78)
and
D(PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n‖PUkZkV kXnY n)
≥ kD(PZ˜J‖PZ) + nD(PY˜Jn |X˜Jn ‖PY |X |PX˜Jn )
+ kD(PU˜J V˜J |Z˜JW˜J‖PU |ZPV |U |PZ˜JW˜J ). (79)
The proof of Lemma 5 is provided in Appendix D.
Define random variables (U ′, Z ′, V ′, X ′, Y ′,W ′) such that
U ′ = U˜J , Z ′ = Z˜J , V ′ = VJ , X ′ = XJn , Y
′ =
YJn and W
′ = (WJ , J). Using the joint distribution of
(U˜k, Z˜k, V˜ k, X˜n, Y˜ n) in (49) and the definitions of Wi, J
and Jn, we obtain the joint distribution PU ′Z′V ′W ′ of random
variables (U ′, Z ′, V ′,W ′) and the joint distribution PX′Y ′ of
random variables (X ′, Y ′).
Combining (30), (73) and Lemma 5, we conclude that given
any (α, β, γ) ∈ R2+, for any (fn,k, gn,k, P kZ|U ) such that n ≤
kτ and β1(fn,k, gn,k) ≤ ε and I(P kU , P kZ|U ) ≤ kL,
− log β2(fn,k, gn,k)
≤ kRτα,β,γ(PU ′Z′V ′W ′ , PX′Y ′)
+ (6α+ 2β + γ + 4) log
2
1− ε (80)
≤ kRτα,β,γ + (6α+ 2β + γ + 4) log
2
1− ε (81)
9≤ kRτα,β + kτc(α, β, γ, τ)
+ (6α+ 2β + γ + 4) log
2
1− ε , (82)
where (81) follows from the definition of Rτα,β,γ in (31), (82)
follows from Claim 2) in Lemma 4. Thus, for any (α, β, γ) ∈
R3+,
E∗(k, τ, L, ε) ≤ Rτα,β + τc(α, β, γ, τ)
+
(6α+ 2β + γ + 4) log 21−ε
k
. (83)
Let (α∗, β∗) be optimizer in Lemma 4 such that Rτα,β =
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). Since both α∗ and β∗ are finite, choosing
γ =
√
k, using the definition of c(α, β, γ, τ), we have
lim inf
k→∞
E∗(k, τ, L, ε) ≤ Rτα∗,β∗ (84)
= f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). (85)
V. CONCLUSION
We derived the privacy-utility tradeoff in a hypothesis
testing problem against independence over a noisy channel.
In particular, we provided exact asymptotic characterization of
the type-II error exponent subject to a privacy constraint for the
information source measured using mutual information and a
constant constraint on the type-I error probability. Our results
imply that the asymptotic privacy-utility tradeoff cannot be
increased by tolerating a larger type-I error probability, which
is known as a strong converse result. The strong converse
theorems for several other important problems, including [4],
[12], [31], are either established or recovered from our results.
To better understand the privacy-utility tradeoff, one could
develop novel techniques to obtain second-order asymptotic
result [32, Chapter 2] for the problem, which reveals the non-
asymptotic fundamental limit. Such a result is more intuitive
for practical situations where both the observation and com-
munication are limited (i.e., n and k are both finite). It is also
interesting to generalize our proof ideas to derive or strengthen
the privacy-utility tradeoff for other hypothesis testing or com-
munication problems, e.g., [11], [13]. Furthermore, one can
study the privacy-utility tradeoff for the Bayesian setting [33]
of the present problem where the utility is the decay rate of
the average of type-I and type-II error probabilities. Finally,
for the privacy constraint, one can study other measures, such
as Re´nyi divergence [15], [34] or maximal leakage [35], [36],
which includes mutual information as a special case.
APPENDIX
A. Justification of (21)
Recall the definition of the set J (A,B, PA). Under the high
privacy limit where L = ρ
2
2 for arbitrary small ρ, the privacy
mechanism PZ|U can be written as1
PZ|U (z|u) = QZ(z) + ρJ(u, z), (86)
where J(u, z) is the z-th element of u-th row of a matrix
J ∈ J (U ,Z, PU ).
1Readers can see [10] for a detailed explanation.
Thus, for each z ∈ Z , the induced marginal distribution PZ
of PU and PZ|U satisfies
PZ(z) = QZ(z). (87)
Using Euclidean information theory [23], [24], we have that
I(PU , PZ|U )
=
∑
u
PU (u)D(PZ|U=u‖PZ) (88)
≈ 1
2
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z
(PZ|U (z|u)− PZ(z))2
PZ(z)
(89)
≈ ρ
2
2
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z
J(u, z)2
QZ(z)
. (90)
Recall the definition of Q¯W in (16). The induced distribu-
tions PW and PW |V of PZ and PW |Z satisfy that for any
(v, w) ∈ V ×W ,
PW (w) = QW (w), (91)
and
PW |V (w|v)
= Q¯W (w) + ρ
∑
u,z
PU |V (u|v)PW |Z(w|z)J(u, z). (92)
Similar to (90), using the definition of h(J, rho) in (20), we
have
I(PV , PW |V )
=
∑
v
PV (v)D(PW |V=v‖PW ) (93)
≈ 1
2
∑
v
PV (v)
∑
w
(PW |V (w|v)− Q¯W (w))2
Q¯W (w)
(94)
≈ h(J, ρ). (95)
The justification of (21) is completed by combining these
approximations.
If we further assume that τC(PY |X) =
ρ2
2 , then the
conditional probability PW |Z should satisfy that for any QW ∈
Q(W),
PW |Z(w|z) = QW (w) + ρΘ(w, z) (96)
where Θ ∈ J (W,Z, QZ).
Then we have that induced marginal distribution PW of PZ
and PW |Z satisfies that for any w ∈ W ,
PW (w) = QW (w) (97)
Similar to (90), we have
I(PZ , PW |Z) =
∑
z
PZ(z) log
PW |Z(w|z)
PW (w)
(98)
≈ ρ
2
2
∑
z
PZ(z)
∑
w
(Θ(w, z))2
QW (w)
(99)
=
ρ2
2
∑
z,w
QZ(z)
(Θ(w, z))2
QW (w)
, (100)
where (100) follows from (87).
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Furthermore, the induced distribution PW |V and PW satis-
fies that
PW |V (w|v)
= QW (w) + ρ
2
∑
u,v
PU |V (u|v)J(u, z)Θ(w, z). (101)
Thus, using Euclidean information theory, similar to (90), we
have
I(PV , PW |V )
≈ ρ
4
2
∑
v,w
PV (v)
QW (w)
(∑
u,z
PU |V (u|v)J(u, z)Θ(w, z)
)2
.
The justification of (23) is completed by combining above
approximations for mutual information terms.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
1) Proof of Claim 1): From the definition of Rτα,β in (11),
we have
Rτα,β
= sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
QXY ∈C:QY |X=PY |X
Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY ) (102)
= sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
(
I(QV , QW |V )− αI(QZ , QW |Z)
− βI(QU , QZ|U ) + βL
)
+ sup
QXY ∈C:QY |X=PY |X
ατI(QX , QY |X)) (103)
= sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
(
I(QV , QW |V )− αI(QZ , QW |Z)
− βI(QU , QZ|U ) + βL
)
+ ατC(PY |X) (104)
= sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
(
I(QV , QW |V ) + ατC(PY |X)
− αI(QZ , QW |Z) + β(L− I(QU , QZ|U ))
)
, (105)
where (104) follows from the definition of C(PY |X) in (4).
We first prove the ≤ case. For any (α, β) ∈ R2+,
Rτα,β ≥ sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV ):
I(QZ ,QW |Z)≤τC(PY |X)
I(QU ,QZ|U )≤L
I(QV , QW |V ) (106)
= f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). (107)
We then prove the ≥ case. For this purpose, let
R :=
⋃
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
{
(E¯, R¯, L¯) ∈ R3+ :
E¯ ≤ I(QV , QW |V ), τ R¯ ≥ I(QZ , QW |Z)
L¯ ≥ I(QU , QZ|U )
}
. (108)
It then follows that
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X)
= sup{E¯ ∈ R+ : (E,C(PY |X), L) ∈ R}. (109)
Consider any Eˆ ∈ R+ such that (Eˆ, C(PY |X), L) /∈ R.
From (109), we have that there exists some δ ∈ R+ such that
Eˆ > f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X). (110)
Note that R is a closed convex set. The separating support-
ing hyperplane theorem [37, Example 2.20] implies that there
exists (α∗, β∗) ∈ R2+ such that for any (E¯, R¯, L¯) ∈ R,
Eˆ − α∗τC(PY |X)− β∗L > E¯ − α∗τR¯− β∗L¯. (111)
Thus,
Eˆ − α∗τC(PY |X)− β∗L
> sup
(E¯,R¯,L¯)∈R
(E¯ − α∗τR¯− β∗L¯) (112)
> sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
(
I(QV , QW |V )− α∗I(QZ , QW |Z)
− β∗I(QU , QZ|U )
)
. (113)
Using (105), we conclude that
Eˆ > Rτα∗,β∗ . (114)
Thus, Eˆ > f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) implies Eˆ > Rτα,β and
f(τ, L, PUV , PY |X) ≥ Rτα∗,β∗ (115)
≥ min
(α,β)∈R2+
Rτα,β . (116)
2) Proof of Claim 2): Using the definition of Rτα,β in (11),
we have
Rτα,β
= sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
QXY ∈C:QY |X=PY |X
Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY ) (117)
= sup
QUV ZW∈Q(PUV )
QXY ∈C:QY |X=PY |X
(
Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY )
−∆τγ(QUV ZW , QXY )
)
(118)
≤ sup
QUV ZW∈Q
QXY ∈C
(
Rτα,β(QUV ZW , QXY )−∆τγ(QUV ZW , QXY )
)
(119)
= Rτα,β,γ , (120)
where (118) follows since ∆τγ(QUV ZW , QXY ) = 0 (cf. (29))
for QUV ZW ∈ Q(PUV ) and QXY ∈ C : QY |X = PY |X ,
(119) follows since Q(PUV ) ⊂ Q and (120) follows from the
definition of Rτα,β,γ in (31).
For any (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+, let (Qα,β,γUV ZW , Qα,β,γXY ) be an
optimizer of Rτα,β,γ and let Q
α,β,γ
· be a distribution induced
by either Qα,β,γUV ZW or Q
α,β,γ
XY . From the support lemma [38,
Appendix C], we obtain that the cardinality of W can be upper
bounded as a function of |U|, |V| and |Z|, which is finite.
Furthermore, let Pα,β,γUV ZW and P
α,β,γ
XY be defined as follows:
Pα,β,γUV ZW = PZQ
α,β,γ
W |Z PU |ZPV |U (121)
Pα,β,γXY = Q
α,β,γ
X PY |X . (122)
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Since divergence terms are non-negative, for any (α, β) ∈
R2+,
Rτα,β,γ
= Rτα,β(Q
α,β,γ
UV ZW , Q
α,β,γ
XY )−∆τγ(Qα,β,γUV ZW , Qα,β,γXY ) (123)
≤ Rτα,β(Qα,β,γUV ZW , Qα,β,γXY ) (124)
≤ Rτα,β(Pα,β,γUV ZW , Pα,β,γXY ) + c(α, β, γ, τ) (125)
≤ Rτα,β + c(α, β, γ, τ), (126)
where (125) is justified in Appendix C and (126) follows since
Pα,β,γUV ZW ∈ Q(PUV ) and Pα,β,γXY satisfies that Pα,β,γY |X = PY |X .
C. Justification of (125)
From the definitions of (Qα,β,γUV ZW , Q
α,β,γ
XY ) and
(Pα,β,γUV ZW , P
α,β,γ
XY ), we have
D(Qα,β,γUV ZW ‖Pα,β,γUV ZW ) = D(Qα,β,γZ ‖PZ)
+D(Qα,β,γUV |ZW ‖PU |ZPV |U‖Qα,β,γZW ),
(127)
D(Qα,β,γXY ‖Pα,β,γXY ) = D(Qα,β,γY |X ‖PY |X |QγX). (128)
Using the definition of ∆τγ(·) in (29) and recalling that
(Qα,β,γUV ZW , Q
α,β,γ
XY ) is an maximizer for R
τ
α,β,γ (cf. (31)), we
have
γD(Qα,β,γUV ZW ‖Pα,β,γUV ZW ) + τγD(Qα,β,γXY ‖Pα,β,γXY )
= ∆τγ(Q
α,β,γ
UV ZW , Q
α,β,γ
XY ) (129)
= Rτα,β(Q
α,β,γ
UV ZW , Q
α,β,γ
XY )−Rτα,β,γ (130)
≤ Rτα,β(Qα,β,γUV ZW , Qα,β,γXY )−Rτα,β,γ (131)
≤ log |V|+ (α+ β) log |Z|+ ατ log |Y| (132)
= c(α, β, τ), (133)
where (131) follows from the definitions of Rτα,β and R
τ
α,β,γ
in (11) and (31) respectively and (133) follows from the
definition of c(α, β, τ) in (8). Thus,
D(Qα,β,γUV ZW ‖Pα,β,γUV ZW ) ≤
c(α, β, τ)
γ
, (134)
D(Qα,β,γXY ‖Pα,β,γXY ) ≤
c(α, β, τ)
τγ
. (135)
Using (134), Pinsker’s inequality and data processing in-
equality for KL divergence, we have
‖Qα,β,γVW − Pα,β,γVW ‖ ≤
√
2D(Qα,β,γVW ‖Pα,β,γVW ) (136)
≤
√
2D(Qα,β,γUV ZW ‖Pα,β,γUV ZW ) (137)
≤
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
. (138)
Using [8, Lemma 2.2.7], we have
∣∣H(Qα,β,γVW )−H(Pα,β,γVW )∣∣ ≤
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
log
|V||W|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
.
(139)
Similarly,
∣∣H(Qα,β,γV )−H(Pα,β,γV )∣∣ ≤
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
log
|V|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
,
(140)∣∣H(Q¯α,β,γW )−H(Pα,β,γW )∣∣ ≤
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
log
|W|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
.
(141)
Therefore,∣∣I(Q¯α,β,γW , Qα,β,γV |W )− I(Pα,β,γW , Pα,β,γV |W )∣∣
≤ ∣∣H(Qα,β,γV )−H(Pα,β,γV )∣∣+ ∣∣H(Q¯α,β,γW )−H(Pα,β,γW )∣∣
+
∣∣H(Qα,β,γVW )−H(Pα,β,γVW )∣∣ (142)
≤ 3
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
log
|W||V|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
. (143)
Similarly to (143), we have∣∣I(Q¯α,β,γW , Qα,β,γZ|W )− I(Pα,β,γW , Pα,β,γZ|W )∣∣
≤ 3
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
log
|W||Z|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
, (144)
∣∣I(Qα,β,γX , Qα,β,γY |X )− I(Pα,β,γX , Pα,β,γY |X )∣∣
≤ 2
√
2c(α, β, τ)
τγ
log
|X ||Y|√
2c(α,β,τ)
τγ
, (145)
∣∣I(Qα,β,γZ , Qα,β,γU |Z )− I(Pα,β,γZ , Pα,β,γZ|U )∣∣
≤ 3
√
2c(α, β, τ)
γ
log
|U||Z|√
2c(α,β,τ)
γ
(146)
where distributions Qα,β,γ· is induced by either Q
α,β,γ
UV ZW or
Qα,β,γXY and similarly for distributions P
α,β,γ
· .
The justification of (125) is completed by combing (143) to
(145) with the following triangle inequality∣∣Rτα,β(Qα,β,γUV ZW , Qα,β,γXY )−Rτα,β(Pα,β,γUV ZW , Pα,β,γXY )∣∣
≤ ∣∣I(Q¯α,β,γW , Qα,β,γV |W )− I(Pα,β,γW , Pα,β,γV |W )∣∣
+ α
∣∣I(Q¯α,β,γW , Qα,β,γZ|W )− I(Pα,β,γW , Pα,β,γZ|W )∣∣
+ ατ
∣∣I(Qα,β,γX , Qα,β,γY |X )− I(Pα,β,γX , Pα,β,γY |X )∣∣
+ β
∣∣I(Qα,β,γZ , Qα,β,γU |Z )− I(Pα,β,γZ , Pα,β,γZ|U )∣∣. (147)
D. Proof of Lemma 5
Similarly to [9, Proposition 1], we have
H(U˜k) +D(PU˜k‖P kU )
= kH(U˜J) + kD(PU˜J‖PU ), (148)
H(Z˜k, V˜ k) +D(PZ˜kV˜ k‖P kZV )
= k
(
H(Z˜J , V˜J) +D(PZ˜J V˜J‖PZV )
)
, (149)
H(Y˜ n|X˜n) +D(PY˜ n|X˜n‖PnY |X |PX˜n)
= nH(Y˜Jn |X˜Jn) + nD(PY˜Jn |X˜Jn ‖PY |X |PXJn ). (150)
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Then we have
I(U˜k; Z˜k)
= H(U˜k)−H(U˜k|Z˜k) (151)
= kH(U˜J)−
∑
i∈[k]
H(U˜i|U˜ i−1, Z˜k)
+ kD(PU˜J‖PU )−D(PU˜k‖P kU ) (152)
≥ kH(U˜J)−
∑
i∈[k]
H(U˜i|Z˜i)−D(PU˜k‖P kU ) (153)
= kH(U˜J)− kH(U˜J |Z˜J)−D(PU˜k‖P kU ) (154)
= kI(U˜J ; Z˜J)−D(PU˜k‖P kU ) (155)
≥ kI(U˜J ; Z˜J)− 2 log 1− ε
2
, (156)
where (156) follows from the non-negativity of KL divergence
and the result in (53).
Furthermore, we have
I(Y˜ n; V˜ k) =
∑
i∈[k]
I(Y˜ n; V˜i|V˜ i−1) (157)
≤
∑
i∈[k]
I(V˜ i−1, Y˜ n; V˜i) (158)
≤
∑
i∈[k]
I(Z˜i−1, V˜ i−1, Y˜ n; V˜i) (159)
=
∑
i∈[k]
I(Wi; V˜i) (160)
= kI(WJ , J ; V˜J). (161)
and
I(X˜n; Y˜ n)
= H(Y˜ n)−H(Y˜ n|X˜n) (162)
=
∑
i∈[n]
H(Y˜i|Y˜ i−1)−H(Y˜ n|X˜n) (163)
≤
∑
i∈[n]
H(Y˜i)−H(Y˜ n|X˜n) (164)
≤ nH(Y˜Jn)− nH(Y˜Jn |X˜Jn)
− nD(PY˜Jn |X˜Jn ‖PY |X |PXJ ) +D(PY˜ n|X˜n‖P
n
Y |X |PX˜n)
(165)
≤ nI(X˜Jn ; Y˜Jn , Jn) +D(PZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n‖PZkV kXnY n)
(166)
≤ nI(X˜Jn ; Y˜Jn , Jn) + 2 log
2
1− ε , (167)
where (165) follows from the result in (150) and (167) follows
from the result in (72).
Similarly, we have
I(Z˜k, V˜ k; Y˜ n)
= H(Z˜k, V˜ k)−H(Z˜k, V˜ k|Y˜ n) (168)
= kH(Z˜J , V˜J) + kD(PZ˜J V˜J‖PUV )−D(PZ˜kV˜ k‖P kUV )
−
∑
i∈[k]
H(Z˜i, V˜i|Z˜i−1, V˜ i−1, Y˜ n) (169)
≥ kH(Z˜J , V˜J)− 2 log 2
1− ε − kH(Z˜J , V˜J |WJ) (170)
= kI(Z˜J , V˜J ;WJ , J)− 2 log 2
1− ε (171)
≥ kI(Z˜J ;WJ , J)− 2 log 2
1− ε , (172)
where (169) follows from (149), (170) follows from the result
in (72).
Furthermore, using non-negativity and convexity of KL
divergence [14], we have
D(PU˜kZ˜kV˜ kX˜nY˜ n‖PUkZkV kXnY n)
= D(PZ˜k‖P kZ) +D(PX˜n|Z˜k‖PXn|Zk |PZ˜k)
+D(PY˜ n|Z˜kX˜n‖PnY |X |PZ˜kX˜n)
+D(PU˜kV˜ k|Z˜kX˜nY˜ n‖P kZ|UP kV |U |PZ˜kX˜nY˜ n) (173)
≥ D(PZ˜k‖P kZ) +D(PY˜ n|Z˜kX˜n‖PnY |X |PZ˜kX˜n)
+D(PU˜kV˜ k|Z˜kX˜nY˜ n‖P kZ|UP kV |U |PZ˜kX˜nY˜ n) (174)
≥ kD(PZ˜J‖PZ) + nD(PY˜Jn |X˜Jn ‖PY |X |PX˜Jn )
+ kD(PU˜J V˜J |Z˜JW˜J‖PU |ZPV |U |PZ˜JW˜J ). (175)
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